Listening to someone from some distance in a crowded room you may experience the following phenomenon: when looking at them speak, you may both hear and see where the source of the sounds is; but when your eyes are turned elsewhere, you may no longer be able to detect exactly where the voice must be coming from. With your eyes again fixed on the speaker, and the movement of her lips a clear sense of the source of the sound will (...) return. This ‘ventriloquist’ effect reflects the ways in which visual cognition can dominate auditory perception. And this phenomenological observation is one what you can verify or disconfirm in your own case just by the slightest reflection on what it is like for you to listen to someone with or without visual contact with them. (shrink)

It is usual to read nomina, with which three interpretations are possible. The stronger arrogates to himself the titles of moderation and justice. So in the excellent Rumanian translation of 1871 by Gavrilu J. Munteanu: ‘Cându are sâ decida pumnulu, celu mai tare si atribue titlu de moderatu şi de onestu.’.

Trust among current and future patients is essential for the success of biobank research. The submission of an informed consent is an act of trust by a patient or a research subject, but a strict application of the rule of informed consent may not be sensitive to the multiplicity of patient interests at stake, and could thus be detrimental to trust. According to a recently proposed law on “genetic integrity” in Sweden, third parties will be prohibited from requesting or seeking (...) genetic information about an individual. Cumbersome restrictions on research may be lifted, thus creating a more favourable climate for medical research. (shrink)

Bodily experience in dreams should be considered illusory to the extent that they cannot be satisfactorily explained or fruitfully investigated by appealing to brain activity alone; rather, to wholly understand the unique phenomenology of embodied selfhood in dreams, one must understand how the brain processes real-body inputs to produce the phenomenology of embodied selfhood in dreams, and why the brain responds the way it does to external stimuli during sleep.

A long-standing theme in discussion of perception and thought has been that our primary cognitive contact with individual objects and events in the world derives from our perceptual contact with them. When I look at a duck in front of me, I am not merely presented with the fact that there is at least one duck in the area, rather I seem to be presented withthisthing (as one might put it from my perspective) in front of me, which looks to (...) me to be a duck. Furthermore, such a perception would seem to put me in a position not merely to make the existential judgment that there is some duck or other present, but rather to make a singular, demonstrative judgment, that that is a duck. My grounds for an existential judgment in this case derives from my apprehension of the demonstrative thought and not vice versa. (shrink)

An embedded automaton is introduced to monitor the whole glycolysis process in pancreatic β-cell and it is a hybridization of both non-deterministic finite automaton and push-down automaton. The set of irreversible and reversible reactions in the glycolysis process are related to non-deterministic finite automaton and push-down automaton respectively. The embedded automaton is used to observe the glucose metabolism with the states of acceptance and rejection. The acceptance state of the embedded automaton depicts the normal level of glycolysis and insulin secretion. (...) The rejection state of this machine shows inhibition of glycolysis which obstructs the secretion of insulin. The subsequent low level of insulin leads to the high blood glucose level also known as hyperglycemia. In this study, the designed machine can be used to regulate the process of glycolysis through a group of regulatory glycolytic enzymes for the treatment of Diabetes mellitus at molecular level. (shrink)

In his, A Critical History of Greek Philosophy, W. T. Stace denies to give Indian schools of thought a philosophical status. He gives three reasons for that—(1) Indian thoughts have practical motivation, (2) instead of rational explanation, it is content with symbolism, and (3) India lies outside the mainstream human civilization. In the defense of Indian philosophy, these three arguments have been countered in this paper from different perspectives. It has been shown that these arguments are rooted in scientism, extreme (...) idealism, and ethnocentrism respectively. Stace has also argued that philosophy has four leading traits—(1) discussing the universe as a whole, (2) generalizing sciences, (3) idealism, and (4) non-practical motivation. For a proper defense, it has been shown that Indian systems share those traits. At the end, a conclusive remark has been given. It has been remarked that Stace’s case is an example of ethnocentric bias and racism. It has also been suggested that the interaction of the philosophies of different civilizations is necessary for the very sake of philosophy. Though this is not the first endeavor to defend Indian philosophy, the literature review (conducted by the author) suggests that Stace’s arguments haven’t been criticized separately. Philosophy and Progress, Vol#73-74; No#1-2; Jan-Dec 2023 P 281-314. (shrink)